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Abstract: Privacy and data protection are fundamental issues nowadays for every organization. This paper calls for
the development of methods, techniques and infrastructure to allow the deployment of privacy-aware IT sys-
tems, in which humans are integral part of the organizational processes and accountable for their possible
misconduct. In particular, we discuss the challenges to be addressed in order to improve organizations privacy
practices, as well as the approach to ensure compliance with legal requirements and increasing efficiency.
1 Data Protection
The ability to protect sensitive information is be-
coming a critical success factor for an increasingly
large number of organizations, because of market
pressure and legal constraints on data processing.
Concerning the market side, we witness that users are
taking into greater consideration the security and pri-
vacy practices of organizations before they subscribe
to a certain service. Concerning the legal side, there
exist a number of laws and regulations in place (e.g.,
Directive 95/46/EC, Privacy Act, HIPAA, etc.) that
put stringent requirements on the collection, process-
ing and disclosure of personal data. Organizations
handling personal data have to implement such re-
quirements in their business procedures.
The protection of sensitive information is of-
ten implemented by access control (Samarati and
di Vimercati, 2001) and usage control (Park and
Sandhu, 2004) systems. Here, protecting data im-
plies guaranteeing that data are disclosed solely un-
der specific conditions to specific users (the legiti-
mate recipient), and that specific obligations are ful-
filled after the data have been accessed. When specif-
ically addressing privacy protection there is an addi-
tional requirement that has to be taken into account,
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the so called purpose specification: “personal data
shall be collected for specified, lawful and legitimate
purposes and not processed in ways that are incom-
patible with the purposes for which data have been
collected” (Guarda and Zannone, 2009).
Nowadays, a number of frameworks exist for the
specification and enforcement of purpose in access
control (Backes et al., 2004; Byun and Li, 2008).
However, these frameworks cannot cope with a num-
ber of increasingly important requirements for mod-
ern organizations. In the last years, organizations
have become more fluid and decentralized, with a big-
ger interplay of physical and digital aspects and thin-
ner security barriers. To mention a few aspects that
have an impact on policy compliance:
• Humans play a fundamental role in organization
processes. However, only some human tasks are
under the control of the IT system. Consequently,
the system cannot capture all actions performed
by users and, therefore, it has to make security
decisions on the basis of a partial knowledge.
• Organizations have to adapt quickly to changes
in structure, businesses, and environmental con-
ditions. Organizations thus have to deal increas-
ingly often with unexpected situations.
• Outsourcing is nowadays a common business
practice to reduce costs. Outsourcing has, how-
ever, a strong impact on the data protection re-
quirements of an organization: personal data are
often disclosed to an external supplier over whom
the organization may not have direct control.
None of the access control and privacy enforce-
ment platforms existing today can cope with these
aspects. The fundamental reason is that all these
frameworks are preventative, in the sense that data
are disclosed only if the purpose in the access request
matches the purpose for which the data have been
collected. Preventative frameworks have two main
drawbacks: (1) they do not allow one to determine
if data are actually processed accordingly to the in-
tended (specified) purpose once being disclosed, and
(2) they are too rigid to deal with exceptions.
Therefore, we need a new radically more flexi-
ble approach for the specification and enforcement of
data protection policies to cope with the aforemen-
tioned circumstances. The aim of this paper is to dis-
cuss the main challenges that have to be faced and to
propose research directions for the realization of such
an approach. In particular, we propose:
• a novel purpose representation model that con-
nects the intended purpose of data to the business
activities performed by an organization;
• a-posteriori mechanisms for determining if data
are used in accordance with the specified purpose;
• methods for analyzing user behavior and the pur-
pose of data usage when audit-logs are partial;
• metrics for identifying and measuring the privacy
risks of infringements;
• a novel infrastructure that combines a-priori and
a-posteriori controls to support data protection
compliance in distributed systems.
2 Challenges
Ensuring compliance to data protection policies
that include purpose specification while detecting in-
fringements (and allowing them when appropriate) re-
quires addressing a number of challenges.
Challenge 1 How can we verify that information has
been used to achieve the specified purpose?
Data protection is usually addressed by augmenting
access control models with purpose, obligations, and
conditions (Backes et al., 2004; Byun and Li, 2008;
Hilty et al., 2005; Karjoth et al., 2002). In existing
purpose-based frameworks (Backes et al., 2004; Byun
and Li, 2008), the purpose is treated as a label at-
tached to data which specifies their intended use. Ac-
cess requests are evaluated not only against the iden-
tity of the access requester, the data to be accessed,
and the action to be performed, but also against the
purpose for which access is requested. If the purpose
for which data are requested matches the intended
purpose associated with the data, then the access is
granted. For example, in healthcare a doctor can spec-
ify treatment or clinical research as a purpose when he
requests the data, using the Cross-Enterprise Security
and Privacy Authorization (XSPA) profile of XACML
that defines a purpose attribute and a corresponding
coded value set. However, this and the other proposals
rely on the fact that the data requester (1) has specified
the purpose correctly and legally and (2) will process
data in accordance to the specified purpose.
Challenge 2 How can we verify if the user behavior
is compliant with data protection policies if some hu-
man activities cannot be observed?
Humans have a key role in the business activities of an
organization. Organizational procedures usually de-
scribe human activities next to IT activities. However,
some of human tasks cannot be IT observable (e.g.,
a physician discussing patient data with a colleague
over the phone for second opinion). The compliance
with the purpose thus cannot be checked. Adopting
mechanisms like video surveillance to monitor user
behavior makes the system too intrusive and conse-
quently can encounter social resistance.
Challenge 3 How can we ensure policy compliance
while dealing with unexpected situations?
Policy enforcement is carried out by access/usage
control (Park and Sandhu, 2004; Samarati and
di Vimercati, 2001), digital rights management
(DRM) (Rosenblatt et al., 2001), or trust management
(Chapin et al., 2008). They share a preventive na-
ture: they permit actions authorized in the policy and
just stop the process if something unexpected happens
(Hamlen et al., 2006; Ligatti et al., 2009). In many
application domains like healthcare, users may take
actions that deviate from the normal behavior to re-
spond to the urgency. In such domains, exceptions
are dealt with using the so called break-the-glass pro-
tocol. This protocol takes priority over the running
enforcement mechanism allowing the user to perform
the required action. This makes existing enforcement
mechanisms inadequate for the enforcement of data
protection policies. Auditing has been used to an-
alyze the user behavior: the system logs users’ ac-
tions and then the logs are analyzed manually to iden-
tify possible misconduct. However, analyzing every
exception can be time consuming and costly. Some
steps towards systems which allow a-posteriori pol-
icy compliance are already made (Cederquist et al.,
2007). However, existing proposals do not verify if
data are used for the intended purpose.
Challenge 4 How can we ensure the compliance with
data protection policies in modern distributed systems
Figure 1: Linking organizational processes to data protection policies
and when the data processing is outsourced?
Once information has been outsourced, it is no more
under the direct control of the organization. Exist-
ing compliance approaches applicable to distributed
systems can be classified in three categories: (1) so-
lutions that impose the responsibility of providing ev-
idences to the data recipient, (2) solutions that allow
the data controller to monitor data recipient’s IT sys-
tem, (3) solutions that limit possible executions to
prevent policy infringements using mechanisms like
DRM. None of these approaches is flexible enough to
address the requirements of modern distributed sys-
tems mentioned in the introduction. The first ap-
proach relies on the assumption that the data recipi-
ent provided all the evidence necessary to prove his
correct behavior. This implies a trust relationship be-
tween the data controller and the data recipient. The
second approach is invasive and may not be accepted
by the data recipient. The last approach is too restric-
tive to support exceptions.
3 Approach
We propose a method to verify the compliance
of user behavior with data protection policies. The
proposed approach uses and interlinks the following
three components (Fig. 1):
1. Data protection policies define who can access
the data and for which purpose. Policies can also
specify the actions that should be taken once an
authorization is granted (i.e., obligations).
2. System logs record the sequence of actions per-
formed by users (i.e., the actual user behavior).
3. Organizational processes describe the business
processes and procedures of an organization. Or-
ganizational processes represent the actions that
users are expected to take in order to accomplish
a certain goal.
The basic idea is to link the purpose specified in
data protection policies to the goal of organizational
processes (arrow 1 in Fig. 1). Intuitively, if a user re-
quires access to some data for a certain purpose, we
can determine whether the data are used for that pur-
pose by verifying if the system log corresponds to a
valid execution of the process associated with the pur-
pose (arrow 2 in Fig. 1).
Organizations often describe their processes and
procedures using graphical languages like BPMN.
Unfortunately, those languages are informal and leave
room for ambiguity (Dijkman et al., 2008). More-
over, they are not suitable for formal analysis. To ad-
dress these issues, we can take advantage of methods
that provide a translation of BPMN into formal frame-
works for the analysis of business processes (Dijkman
et al., 2008; Prandi et al., 2008). This allows the de-
velopment of tools that automatically detect the in-
fringement of data protection policies.
Besides providing effective and tool-supported
methods to verify the compliance with data protection
policies, defining the purpose using business process
models has a number of advantages: (1) organizations
can reuse the knowledge they already have without
further efforts; and (2) it allows for the management
of purpose and data protection policies.
The proposed approach alone may not be suffi-
cient when we consider the human component in or-
ganizational processes. Procedures may contain hu-
man actions that cannot be logged by the IT system.
Because of missing information about user behavior
we cannot ensure that data have been processed wrt
the intended purpose. Therefore, we have to extend
our initial approach with a method that verifies if sys-
tem logs correspond to a valid sequence of observable
actions of the workflow. In addition, qualitative rea-
soning on business processes (Prandi et al., 2008) can
be used to obtain evidence of possible misbehavior.
Many application domains like healthcare require
dealing with exceptions. For instance, a physician can
take actions that diverge from the procedures adopted
by the hospital to face emergency situations. Pre-
venting such actions may be critical for the life of
the patient. To address this problem, we need to de-
fine acceptable infringements and metrics for assess-
ing privacy risks by performing real-time risk analy-
sis. This make it possible to narrow down the number
of situations where rightful data usage is under inves-
tigation by considering only situations whose privacy
risks cannot be tolerated by the data subject.
Outsourcing is becoming a common business
practice of many organizations. This business strat-
egy is adopted to reduce costs, but it involves trans-
fer of business activities and data to an external sup-
plier. Suppose that the hospital outsources some ther-
apeutic activities to a subcontractor together with the
data needed for its execution. The hospital is no
more in control of such data. Therefore, it needs ev-
idence that the subcontractor has used the informa-
tion only for providing therapeutic treatments. To
address those requirements for data protection policy
compliance in distributed systems, we need an infras-
tructure that supports different security mechanisms
as well as infringement management. The infrastruc-
ture should allow seamless interoperability of differ-
ent enforcement mechanism, such as DRM, and on
the other hand deterring security mechanism such as
audit logic. This also requires real-time risk analy-
sis models that make it possible to define at run-time
flexible boundaries between preventive and deterring
mechanisms (i.e., dynamically select the most proper
mechanism for a certain situation based on the risks it
involves).
4 Conclusion
This paper has defined the basis for the develop-
ment of more trustworthy and privacy-aware IT sys-
tems. In particular, this work intends
• support organizations in ensuring compliance
with data protection policies as the ability of iden-
tifying policy infringements will provide a con-
crete way to ensure organizations that they are
meeting their privacy promises;
• make users more accountable for their actions as
user behavior will be analyzed and possible mis-
conducts detected;
• be more flexible to deal with exceptions as the a-
posteriori policy compliance would make it pos-
sible to continue operations and account users for
eventual misconduct afterwards;
• provide more usable and scalable tools which will
automate many operations that are currently per-
formed by humans.
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